

METAGOVERNANCE OF CLIMATE POLICIES: MOVING TOWARDS MORE VARIATION

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Abstract

Climate change governance, especially on the global level, currently has a strong hierarchical bias. This is problematic, because climate change can be characterized as a complex and ‘wicked’ problem type, for which hierarchical mechanisms are insufficient. In addition, a rigid focus on hierarchical steering neglects that the effectiveness of any (global or national) governance approach depends on its adaptation to, or at least acceptance by, national or regional cultures.

Some argue that governance that focuses on legally binding agreements (hierarchy) is the only way forward. For them, climate change is an emergency. Others claim that we live in a world in which only network governance leads to results. This paper argues that both arguments fall short. Climate governance requires a variety of approaches, some centralised, some decentralised, here legally binding, there voluntary, etc.. We should not try to find the holy grail of climate change governance, but accept that governance of complex societal problems requires dynamical mixtures of hierarchical, network and market styles of governance, which allow variation in time, in place, and in the roles of governmental and non-governmental actors. Such a *metagovernance* of climate policy will probably lead to a stronger focus on soft, network forms of governance, which will require a partnership attitude of all actors. At the same time, this approach allows that hierarchical governance remains available for dealing with climate emergencies and for producing legally binding agreements, and assumes that market mechanisms may still be useful for routine issues and as incentives for innovation. Finally, metagovernance of climate policies allows for different

1 The hierarchical focus of climate governance

Climate change requires mitigation and adaptation measures on all levels of government, from local to global. These measures are developed in a world in which connectedness seems to have become the measure of power (Slaughter 2009: 94). Castells (2009:42) even differentiates between four forms of network-related power: networking power, network power, networked power and network-making power. Many politicians claim to have understood the new paradigm, and talk about participation and other elements of network governance. However, like in many other policy fields, the reality of climate governance shows a focus on hierarchical governance. Centralized decision making and institutions and legislation are popular. The 2009 UN Climate conference in Copenhagen was characterised by at least four implicit premises¹ which are inspired by hierarchical governance:

¹ Personal communication by Mr. Maas Goote, Lead negotiator for the European Union during the Copenhagen UNFCCC conference in December 2009.

- An overall agreement should be prepared by one central organisation, in this case the UNFCCC;
- Such an agreement should be concluded during one single conference ('big bang' theory);
- Only a legally binding agreement is a good result and
- International decision making on climate change governance should be purely governmental.

We could add a fifth point which regards the quality of policy-relevant knowledge: from a hierarchical viewpoint, such knowledge should be authoritative, but authoritativeness has shown to be an asset as volatile as trust (see: IPCC, financial institutions). In addition, a market governance instrument like emission trading has become one of the most important means for climate change mitigation. The problem here is that the expected price mechanisms around emission trading have – at least not yet – been successful.

We will discuss first why the current hierarchical focus of climate governance is a problem. The next question is, what are the alternatives.

2 What is wrong with the focus on hierarchical climate change governance?

The problem of climate change governance is not that the prevailing hierarchical approach is not useful, but that it is insufficient. This is illustrated by the following seven points:

- The technological bias underestimates societal turbulence
- Hierarchy only accepts problems framed along institutional borders
- If you only have a hammer, you tend to see every problem as a nail
- Hierarchical governance does not solve 'wicked' problems
- Hierarchy is not a common and global culture
- Authoritative knowledge is scarce
- Stakeholders who can only participate will not take responsibility.

2.1 The technological bias underestimates societal turbulence

Both climate mitigation and adaptation policy processes are technology based, large-scale and top-down (Ayers et al. 2010:271). This presumes a stable, clear and predictable world. However, the design and implementation of climate change policy takes place in a changing world, in which we not only are the witness of a range of interrelated global environmental problems, but also of turbulent economical and geopolitical changes. In addition, the Internet and ICT have made the world smaller. A concept that tries to grasp some of the most important societal tensions is that of the emerging *knowledge democracy*. This concept addresses the dynamics of the new world as the growing tensions between centralist and deliberative forms of science, politics and media and the interaction between these sectors (in 't Veld 2010). In 't Veld describes the emergence of turbulent democracies, which are characterized by a lack of consensus, a dominance of mutual dependency of politics and media, a tension between a bottom-up call for more participation and the wish to monopolise information by politicians, and a lack of checks and balances. This development may make preparing successful climate policies more difficult. However, the glass may be also half full: according to In 't Veld, our societies become more and more reflexive and may be able to compensate for the disadvantages.

What could the above imply for climate change policies? In the first place, the acceptance of climate policy measures depends to an extent to the perceived quality of the democratic decision making process that underlies such measures. In different nations, such perceptions may differ. Citizens of nations with a tradition of consensual democracy probably expect more stakeholder and citizens' involvement than in nations with a centralist style of decision making. At least in Western-style democracies, the pressure towards deliberative processes seems to increase.

Although the IPCC process seems modern because of its network-type consensual process within the science community, the results – quite paradoxically - seem to be weighed by politicians and the media on

the parameter of classical scientific authority: science should produce the truth and nothing but the (one) truth. Illustrative was the statement of a former Dutch Environment minister on 3th February 2010, on Dutch television: “*I will not accept any more mistakes from the IPCC. As a politician I must be able to have blind trust in what science says.*”²

The formal and informal media play an growing role in framing facts and events. They add to the turbulence of our societies by the competition to present facts and opinions as soon as possible, 24 hours per day.

2.2 If you only have a hammer, you tend to see every problem as a nail

The first question of a recent edited book, written by a team of 30 leading experts from the European Union and developing countries is: “What is the most effective overall legal and institutional architecture for successful and equitable climate politics?” The framing of this question reveals an assumption that there is *one* solution to the problem of climate change, and it is a *legal* one. The editors of the book seem to share the preference for hierarchical governance of many policy-makers.

The aphorism in the title of this section is attributed to Abraham Maslov (1907-1970). In the context of this paper it means that if hierarchy is the main view of policy-makers, every problem tends to be addressed with legal solutions. That is inadequate, because the governance-‘toolbox’ contains more than only a hammer.

Governance can be defined neutrally, as ‘the totality of interactions of governments, other public bodies, the private sector and civil society, aiming at solving societal problems or creating societal opportunities’ (Meuleman 2008). There are also normative definitions, like ‘good governance’ or governance based on networking values. Scholarly literature often distinguishes three basic or ideal-typical styles of governance that each have a different but distinct logic: hierarchical, network and market governance (for example Thompson 2003, Kickert 2003). These styles usually appear in combinations. Hierarchical, network and market governance can undermine each other, and each of the styles has advocates who believe that ‘their’ style is a panacea. The styles also have typical failures: hierarchy may lead to suffocating bureaucracy (‘red tape’), network governance may provoke endless talks without results, and market governance can lead to all problems of normal markets.

The three styles differ in at least 35 dimensions (Table 1, after Meuleman 2008). This is on the one hand an enormous potential for conflicts, but on the other hand a rich ‘tool box’ for politicians, policy makers and public managers.

	Hierarchical governance	Network governance	Market governance
Vision & strategy			
<i>Culture/Way of life</i>	Hierarchism	Egalitarianism	Individualism

² Dutch NOS TV, 3th February 2010. Dutch

<i>Theor. background</i>	Rational, positivism	Social constructivism	Rational choice theory
<i>Mode of calculation</i>	Homo hierarchicus	Homo politicus	Homo economicus
<i>Primary virtues</i>	Reliable	Flexible, discretion	Cost-driven
<i>Motives</i>	Minimising risk	Satisfying identity	Maximising advantage
<i>Roles of government</i>	Government rules society	Government is partner in a network society	Government delivers services to society
<i>Strategy style</i>	Planning and design	Learning style; Chaos style	Getting competitive advantage
Orientation			
<i>Perception of actors</i>	Subjects	Partners	Customers, clients
<i>Organisational orientation</i>	Top down, formal, internal	Informal, reciprocity, open-minded, external	Bottom up, suspicious, external
<i>Aim of stocktaking actors</i>	Anticipation of protest/obstruction	Better results and acceptance	Finding profitable contract partners
Structure & process			
<i>Organisation structure</i>	Line organization, centralised	Soft structure, few rules and regulations	Decentralised, autonomous, agencies
<i>Flexibility</i>	Low	Medium	High
<i>Roles of knowledge</i>	Supporting authority	Shared good	Competitive advantage
<i>Type of knowledge</i>	Authoritative	Agreed knowledge	Cost-effective
<i>Coordinaton method</i>	Imperatives	Diplomacy	Competition
<i>Control through</i>	Authority	Trust	Price
<i>Communication style</i>	Giving information	Organising dialogue	Influencing, PR
People			
<i>Leadership style</i>	Top down	Coaching, supporting	Empowering
<i>Relation type</i>	Dependent	Mutual dependent	Independent
<i>Competences</i>	Legal, financial	Social sc., Process management	Economy, marketing
<i>Values</i>	Legitimacy, accountability, justice, law of the jungle,	Community, empathy, harmony	Self-determination, self-realisation
<i>Aim of management development</i>	Increase obedience	Learn to 'muddling through'	Efficient decision making
Substance			

<i>Problem type</i>	Crises, disasters, legal issues	Complex, multi-actor, wicked problems	Routine problems, non-sensitive issues
<i>Typical failures</i>	Ineffectiveness, red tape	Never-ending talks	Market failures
<i>Typical perversions</i>	Abuse of power (e.g. clientelism)	Abuse of trust (manipulation)	Abuse of money (corruption)
<i>Type of instruments</i>	Laws, regulations, compliance	Consensus, agreements, covenants	Service, contract, product

Table 1. Differences between hierarchical, network and market governance (after Meuleman 2008).

Climate change governance is dominated by hierarchical governance (for example: UNFCCC as a supranational organization of states, the framed problem type is an emergency, preference for legal measures), but we can also observe network dimensions (Cities for Climate Action Campaign) and market governance instruments (emission trade system) (Pattberg and Stripple 2008).

2.3 Hierarchical governance does not solve ‘wicked’ problems

A governance system should have at least the same level of variety as the system that is the object of governance. In other words: the feasibility of a governance design depends on the ‘match’ with the problem type.

Each of the three ideal types hierarchy, network and market is typically better usable for dealing with certain types of problems than the other types. Hierarchical governance, with its carefully defined division of tasks, is successful in dealing with problems that can also be divided into clear sub-problems. This approach is for example useful when catching criminals or tackling a disaster. Government agencies who are responsible for safety, for instance usually work with detailed emergency plans with a clear command structure. Complex, unstructured problems are better dealt with through some form of network governance. Dealing with uncertainty requires trust, empathy and dialogue between partners. Routine issues are the best example of problems that can be tackled successfully through market governance, because for such problems efficiency is a prominent objective.

The point is, that climate change is at least to a substantial extent a wicked problem. Focusing only on hierarchical governance inevitably leads to suboptimal results, because it does neither address the wicked dimensions nor the routine aspects of climate policy.

2.4 Hierarchy is not a common and global culture

The focus on hierarchical governance neglects that any governance approach should be adapted to the existing rich variation of international, national, regional and local problem perceptions, societal cultures and problem-solving traditions (Meuleman 2008, 2010a). Living cultures “are based on the legacies of the past, the ideas of the present and the hopes for the future” (Kavaliku :23). Governance is a form of social coordination and governance *styles* reflect specific sets of shared values and beliefs and certain patterns of interpersonal relations. If we define a culture as “the values, attitudes, beliefs, orientations, and underlying assumptions prevalent among people in a society” (Huntington 2000: xv), and consider cultures also as a dynamic pattern of assumptions in a given group (Schein 1987: 9), then the three ideal-typical governance styles are also (reflections of) cultures.

Each of the three styles has a clear and distinct internal logic which is embedded in values. For example, the central value of hierarchical governance is authority; therefore the output must be authoritative and

legitimate. Empathy and trust are central in network governance, and therefore results are expected to be based on consensus. Market governance is based on competition and price, which makes it logical that the best results are the most competitive and cheapest products.

This internal logic seems so attractive that many policy makers and politicians adopted one of the styles as their belief system or doctrine. To them it presents a truth that has to be accepted without proof. The logic of the styles makes them panaceas, which are fiercely defended by their advocates. The point seems to be, that governance styles are not only politico-administrative concepts, but also have a cultural dimension.

The cultural dimension of political and public administration science was neglected for a long time (Geva-May 2002: 388). One of the reasons was that it did not fit in the dominant paradigm of the post-war period, which was rational choice theory. Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky (1990: 1, 5) distinguished five cultures or 'ways of life'. Three of them are characterised by active interpersonal relations, and two are not, but for different reasons. The three socially *active* ways of life show quite similar values and preferences as the three ideal-typical governance styles. *Hierarchism*, *egalitarianism* and *individualism* are, regarding social coordination, analogous to hierarchical, network and market governance. Like the three governance styles, the three ways of life compete with each other, often in a hostile way. On the other hand they complete one another, and they therefore continue to co-exist. "That what we today define as free societies – those with the rule of law, alternation in office, and the right to criticise – are a product of the interpenetration of hierarchism, individualism, and egalitarianism" (Thompson et al. 1990: 50,257).

The two other 'ways of life' are not separate governance styles. *Fatalism*, a 'no trust' style that is found for example in Southern Italy, relates to hierarchism: "Fatalism generates (and is generated by) authoritarian political systems" (Thompson et al. 1990:256). If governance styles are modes of co-ordination, then fatalism cannot be a mode of governance, because it, according to Wildavsky (1987), denies the possibility of co-ordination. *Autonomism*, the fifth way of life Thompson et al. distinguished, seems an extreme form of the individualism of market governance. In this way of life "the individual withdraws from coercive or manipulative social involvement altogether" (Thompson et al. 1990: 7). Because autonomists or 'hermits' accept no social responsibility, it is difficult to see how this way of life can be considered as a governance style: governance requires dealing with public issues. *Clientelism* and *nepotism* are other forms of relational behaviour that can be found in governance arrangements, especially in developing countries in which the ruling party represents a clan or a family. Both require a hierarchical governance basis and a strong collectivist (networking) culture. They are not 'complete' governance styles but rather mixtures of hierarchical and network governance.

It is therefore possible to conclude that there is a strong congruency between three general types of cultures in society ('ways of life') and the three basic governance styles.

Furthermore, there seems to be something like a 'national governance footprint': the more or less stereotypical 'average' composition of the mixture of hierarchy, network and market governance. If we accept the premise that hierarchical, network and market styles of governing are each suitable for solving different types of problems, then the problem-solving capacity of nations may also vary. Moreover, it becomes questionable if governance style(s) mixtures are transferable from one nation to another without adaptation.

Using a specific 'good' governance approach as a best practice has meanwhile led to many failures, for example because some nations show an underlying preference for one of the basic governance styles. National cultures have different preferences for rules and regulations (Barron 2010: 110). Countries like Germany and France prefer hierarchy by default, Anglo-Saxon countries have an underlying preference for market mechanisms, and Scandinavian nations and the Netherlands are more inclined to use network governance (Meuleman 2008).

Considering national cultures as an indicator for which governance style combination might work seems a promising perspective for climate governance. A problem, however, is that there may be considerable differences between the culture of the governing elite in a nation, and the culture of the common people. International climate negotiations are carried out by highly educated officers, who share a common working style. In the words a prominent negotiator: “Climate negotiators tend to instrumentalise their national cultures to serve the negotiation agenda”.

2.5 Authoritative knowledge is scarce

The focus on ‘evidence-based’ policy making which comes with a hierarchical perspective presumes that the (whole) world is knowable and predictable. With such an epistemological approach it is very difficult to deal with conflicts which arise because of the assumptions and values behind knowledge. Usable knowledge for complex and value-laden issues like sustainability and climate change, requires not merely ‘authoritative’ but increasingly also ‘negotiated’, agreed knowledge.

2.6 Stakeholders who can only participate will not take responsibility

Global climate change governance is embedded in the intergovernmental UN process. However, a government-centered approach however disregards that civil society and business are indispensable actors.

The solution may be to design several parallel processes with different roles for different stakeholders and government actors. In any case the impact of non-state actors will increase. This requires a change of attitude on both sides. On the global level, it seems that the stakeholder groups (‘Major Groups’ in UN jargon) have adjusted their role to the dominance of hierarchical governance of the UN. They behave as (dependent) subordinates to governments and intergovernmental bodies, and only advocate *participation* in government-led policy processes. Moving towards a more prominent role of network governance implies creating *partnerships* based on trust and the understanding that there is interdependency. If it is believed that also market mechanisms are important to achieve climate policy objectives, business actors would have to free themselves from the dependent role and strive for innovation from an independent, competitive basis.

A move towards more network governance requires adaptation of the negotiation method. The classical win-lose approach may be useful according to the hierarchical paradigm, the network approach necessitates that all actors are respected, that standpoints are less important than the interests behind them, and that the best solution to a problem is a win-win result. In the so-called mutual gains approach to negotiation (Susskind and Field 1996) , complexity is not immediately reduced because allowing more complexity helps formulating richer win-win package deals.

2.7 Hierarchy only accepts problems framed along institutional borders

The focus on hierarchical governance leads to concentrating on administrative areas and scales, and thus to neglecting the need of exceeding such barriers when dealing with certain societal problems. However, the feasibility of governance depends also on what works best given the physical borders of a given problem; such borders may be very different from for example national borders. Water systems are a good example. For historical reasons national and regional borders often follow the course of rivers, but water management should take into account the whole catchment area of a river. To overcome this problem, on the scale of the Rhine basin, European countries and regions already in 1950 established the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine (ICPR), which may serve as a successful example.

3 Towards more variation: Metagovernance of climate change policies

3.1 More variation?

Do we need more variation than the current governance of climate change policy contains? This question can be answered affirmatively. The dominance of hierarchical governance leads to unsatisfactory results. One alternative is to completely switch to one of the other styles, but this is also too limited, and we have seen that all styles have their typical failures. Another option is to design a fixed combination of governance styles. This is maybe what the current secretary-general of the UN meant when he (August 2010), during an interview about the establishment of a high level Global Panel on Sustainable Development (an institution related to network governance) stated that what we need now is ‘*a new blueprint for sustainability*’. Blueprinting is a technical metaphor that normally is used for stable, not contested, and predictable challenges, and is related to hierarchical governance. Neither sustainable development, nor climate change policy is primarily a problem of that type. The third way is to create more variation, in time and place. The following sections propose several options to increase the variation, or rather variability, of climate change governance, based on the concept of metagovernance.

3.2 Metagovernance of governance style combinations

The concept of governance styles helps to analyse which climate policy options could be feasible for certain problem types. The concept of metagovernance (Jessop 1997), or governance ‘beyond’ governance, offers an approach that helps to build and manage situationally optimal governance approaches, which may vary over different socio-politico-administrative cultures. Metagovernance can be defined as ‘producing some degree of coordinated governance, by designing and managing sound combinations of hierarchical, market and network governance, in order to achieve the best possible outcomes’ (Meuleman 2008). A ‘metagovernor’ tries to prevent or mitigate governance style conflicts, understands how to combine governance style elements into a productive approach, and knows when and how to switch from one style to another. Biermann et al. (2010) define a similar concept: ‘global governance architecture’, which concerns the meta-level of governance.

A metagovernance of climate change would make use of the complete ‘governance toolbox’ which was presented in Table 1, for example, with regards to the institutional dimension. If we define institutions broadly as sense-making arrangements, the three governance styles offer different options for institutional design:

- Hierarchical governance produces centralised institutions which work on the basis of authority, with rules and regulations and imperatives. Institutions are for example legally based agreements. This aligns with classical representative forms of democracy, but also with authoritarian types of ruling.
- Network governance tends to produce more informal institutions in which trust and empathy are key values. Examples are covenants and internet communities. This shares a logic with deliberative forms of democracy.
- Market governance aims at small, decentralised government, at using market types of institutions such as contracts and public-private partnerships and other hybrid organisations. Decisions are made bottom-up, through mechanisms like the invisible hand of the market.

Metagovernors use three intervention strategies (Meuleman 2008):

- *Combining* styles. Sometimes, during a policy preparation process, network characteristics are used to solve conflicts, market governance mechanisms to develop more innovative solutions, and hierarchical procedures to secure intermediate agreements.
- *Switching* from one to another style, for example when a policy process enters a new phase. Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) distinguished four phases in the life cycle of public partnerships in the field of

urban regeneration: pre-partnership collaboration; partnership creation and consolidation; partnership termination and succession. In the phase of pre-partnership collaboration, networking between individuals and organisations is emphasised. In the phase of partnership creation and consolidation, hierarchy is used to incorporate some organisations, and to formalize authority in a partnership board and associated staff. In the phase of partnership programme delivery, market mechanisms of tendering and contractual agreements are applied. Hierarchy takes care of regulation and supervision of contractors, and networking assists in production of bids and management of expenditure programmes. In the last phase, partnership termination and succession, networking between individuals and organisations is used as a means of maintaining agency commitment, community involvement and staff employment.

- *Maintenance*, for example introducing hierarchical elements like ‘house rules’ in a network, to improve its functioning. The maintenance strategy of metagovernance is probably in essence what is meant with metagovernance of networks (Sørensen and Torfing 2007): it aims at mitigating the failures of network governance by introducing hierarchical and market governance elements. It may be risky to select this as the sole approach, because for example a complex, wicked problem may suddenly become a crisis for which network governance has no management solutions.

The following sections illustrate some of the implications of applying the concept of metagovernance to climate change policies.

3.3 Moving towards more network governance

Framing of climate change as - at least partially – a wicked problem leads to suggest that climate governance should move towards a stronger expression of network governance in the governance mix. Moreover, the idea that we live in a networked world, in which the measure of power is connectedness (Slaughter 2009: 94), has highlighted the enormous possibilities of large networks which the ICT revolution has made possible. Multinational companies have already shown the way. Companies like Procter & Gamble, Boeing and IBM have switched from hierarchical strategy formation to networks forms, with a system of peer production, suppliers becoming partners, and by use of social network options of the Internet (Slaughter 2009: 97).

Also small networks could be used more. New informal approaches have begun to develop. The Netherlands, for example, decided after the disappointment of the 2009 Copenhagen conference, for a more varied approach to climate change, which is not directed against the traditional central (UNFCCC) approach, but enriches this. One of the innovations which emerged in the aftermath of the Copenhagen conference was the establishment of the so-called Cartagena Dialogue. This is a parallel process to the formal UNFCCC negotiations in which around twenty nations participate, looking for new ways forward and concrete action, in an informal way. It is a network form of governance, based on mutual trust en partnership.

A second example is bilateral cooperation between nations, with the involvement also of non-governmental partners. The Netherlands, for example, supports Columbia with knowledge of the TNO applied research institute, to developing an emission registration system. This is an investment in good relations, with very concrete results, and departing not from the premise what *should* be done, but what *can* be done.

3.4 Rediscovering hierarchical governance

Climate governance could profit from a redefinition of the conditions under which hierarchy works well. Bachmann and Töpfer (2010) claim that we do not need less, but more and better legal institutions because we should focus on climate emergencies, and that intergenerational justice also necessitates legal arrangements. Hey (2008) showed that the European Commission made a u-turn with regard to climate policies, from network and market governance towards centralized, hierarchical governance. He argues

that this u-turn was made possible by a broad consensus on the risk of climate change and reformulated economic and institutional actors interests: “policy entrepreneurs used a window of opportunity to bring the problem, the solution and the decision-making streams together and by this to form a powerful new coalition”.

It may, culturally spoken, not be a surprise that this call for a rediscovery of hierarchy stems from German scholars, but also the Scandinavian scholar Olsen (2006) has presented a similar argument. From a meta-governance perspective, hierarchy should indeed stay as part of the climate governance mixture.

3.5 Taking into account the cultural dimension

National, regional and local cultures differ in many ways. We have already seen that the three ideal-typical governance styles hierarchy, network and market, are cultures, or ‘ways of life’ in the sense of Thompson, Ellis and Wildavski (1980)(Meuleman 2008, 2010a).

This could lead to, for example, different approaches in countries with an individualist value pattern and nations with a collectivist culture. It is important that we understand that some of the well-known models of value patterns, like Maslow’s hierarchy of human needs, have a strong Western bias. In Maslow’s model, individualist self-actualisation constitutes the top of the pyramid, whereas in collectivist countries like China, the basic need is belonging, and self-actualisation concerns societal needs (Gambrel and Cianci 2003). The individualist/collectivist divide is one of the five indexes with which intercultural differences have been explained by Hofstede (2001). Another important index is power distance: Cultures with a high acceptance of power distance in society seem more likely to accept hierarchical governance than more consensual nations.

Climate change – and sustainable development as a broader perspective – has a long time dimension. For policy development it is a still widely neglected phenomenon that in different cultures, different concepts of time exist. This is not a new issue. Cote (1989) formulated the challenge as follows:

“If we ask someone about their future behavior, the respondent must have some conception of “future for their answer to be meaningful. Westerners have relatively little difficulty conceiving the “future.” This is not true of all cultures (Meade 1971). Different cultures often have different perceptions about time (McGrath and Rotchford 1983). Graham (1981) identifies three general orientations toward time, linear-separable, circular-traditional, and procedural-traditional. Linear time is most similar to western perceptions of a past, present and future stretching to infinity. Time is also seen as being separable into discrete units along this line. People with a circular time orientation perceive time relative to repeated patterns such as cycles of the sun, moon and seasons. They have no perception of time stretching into the future and therefore, expect the future to be like the past. instead they focus on the present. People with a procedural time orientation view time as being irrelevant. Behavior is activity driven rather than time driven.”

Culturally sensitive metagovernance requires a good insight in different cultures. This is not an easy task. Odhiambo (2002), for example, argues that most research on African cultures uses Western reference frames. According to him, Western culturalism “replicates the patterns of European thought over Africa”, and is responsible for the assumption that there is one African culture, which is e.g. characterized by the notion of African hedonism: the “propensity to consume whatever surpluses we stumble upon with no thought of tomorrow”.

Finally, **** the different ways how people consider other people’s values, may make it even more complicated. In ‘t Veld (2010b) distinguishes five types:

- Hegemony: My values are better than those of other people.
- Separatism: I don’t want to be confronted with the implications of other people’s values.
- Pluralism: Other people’s values may be valuable, and I am co-responsible for protecting them.
- Tolerance: I find my values superior to other people’s values, but I respect their values.

- Indifference: I am not interested in other people’s values.

Governance styles are not only based on different sets of values, but also describe different ways of dealing with other people’s values (Table 2). Hegemony and separatism are related to the top-down and authoritarian thinking of hierarchical governance, pluralism and tolerance to the empathy, trust and respect of network governance, and indifference to the individualism and autonomy of market governance.

Governance style	Way of seeing other people’s values
Hierarchical governance	Hegemony or separatism
Network governance	Pluralism or tolerance
Market governance	Indifference

Table 2. Governance styles and ways of dealing with other people’s values.

3.6 Understand the limitations of metagovernance

A comparative research on metagovernance by public managers in three Western European environmental ministries showed that five framework conditions influence the feasibility of metagovernance (Meuleman 2008). These conditions can undermine each other:

- The first condition consists of the culture, traditions and history of the administrative and societal system. The corresponding underlying governance styles influenced the composition of governance mixtures to a certain extent, but they did not predict a specific style combination. However, they more or less predicted what was the first style to be considered, the ‘default style’. In all investigated administrative systems, the first reflex was to try this underlying style, which was for example market governance in the UK, and network governance in the Netherlands. The other styles were only applied after the default style had turned out to be not appropriate.
- Secondly, the type of problem determines which style would serve best as dominant one. If the policy problem is defined as an urgent matter, the rationale is to choose a hierarchical approach, if it is a routine issue that should be dealt with as efficiently as possible, market governance may work best, and for “wicked” problems, network governance has a lot to offer. This second condition may conflict with the first, which may sometimes be resolved by reframing the policy problem into a different problem type. In one of the investigated cases, British soil protection managers reframed their problem from ‘protecting the soils of England against polluters’ into ‘helping soil users to protect their own interests in clean soils’. The original frame required legal norms, which was politically not feasible. The new frame fitted better into the network style they had moved to as their main approach, and at the same time appealed to the autonomy (market thinking) of the polluters. An earlier attempt to concentrate on market instruments had failed because the issue was politically too unimportant to risk market disturbances.
- Thirdly, the personal conviction of the responsible politician turned out to be an important determinant: which governance style does she or he prefer? In the case studies, the personal conviction of a minister or a city alderman accounted for interventions matching with their ideas about how to solve the problems at hand.
- The next framework condition refers to the societal expectations of the role(s) of governmental organisations. Civil society might lobby for network arrangements, whereas enterprises typically strive for a combination of market and hierarchical governance.
- Finally, organisational characteristics are also important. For example, the organisational culture may be “open” or “closed”, “professional” or “task-oriented”. And the dominant style of leadership may be “command and control”, “coaching” or “enabling”.

Although these limiting factors were observed in soil protection policy cases and further analysis should be carried out, the fact that also a very different case of local policing revealed these conditions, leads to assume that the same, or similar conditions may apply to the metagovernance of climate change.

4 Conclusion: Towards a metagovernance of climate policy

This paper begun with illustrating that climate change governance, especially on the global level, currently has a strong hierarchical bias. This is problematic, because climate change can not only be characterized as an emergency, but also as a complex and ‘wicked’ problem type, for which hierarchical mechanisms are insufficient. In addition, a rigid focus on hierarchical steering neglects that the effectiveness of any (global or national) governance approach depends on its adaptation to, or at least acceptance by, national or regional cultures.

We have seen that some argue that governance that focuses on legally binding agreements (hierarchy) is the only way forward. For them, climate change is an emergency. Others claim that we live in a world in which only network governance leads to results. This paper argues that both arguments fall short. The following conclusions can be drawn:

- Climate governance requires a variety of approaches, some centralised, some decentralised, here legally binding, there voluntary, etc.. We should not try to find the holy grail of climate change governance, but accept that governance of complex societal problems requires dynamical mixtures of hierarchical, network and market styles of governance, which allow variation in time, in place, and in the roles of governmental and non-governmental actors.
- Such a *metagovernance* of climate policy will probably lead to a stronger focus on soft, network forms of governance, which will require a partnership attitude of all actors. A stronger network approach implies moving towards involving non-state actors as partners, not as subjects. This requires a change of attitude of both state and non-state actors. It also means organizing informal forms of cooperation bilaterally of between groups of nations, which can happen parallel to the formal UNFCCC negotiation processes.
- At the same time, this approach allows that hierarchical governance remains important for dealing with climate emergencies and for producing legally binding agreements, and assumes that market mechanisms may still be useful for routine issues and as incentives for innovation.
- Finally, metagovernance of climate policies allows for different approaches in, for example, nations with an individualist or a collectivist culture.

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